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Summary
Using data from the European Election Study 2014, this article focuses on workers’ EU political
alignments during the Great Recession. It deals with two research questions. First, how does the
attitude of (manual) workers towards the EU compare to that of the middle and upper classes in the
aftermath of the Great Recession? Second, when it comes to workers’ support for the EU, are there
systematic differences between countries affected by the crisis? The article finds that, on the one
hand, in terms of patterns of workers’ EU political alignments, there are no systematic differences
between countries affected to varying degrees by the Great Recession. On the other hand, workers
still feel fundamentally detached from the EU, especially when it comes to the manual workers.
However, high levels of generalised detachment from the EU are not clearly translated into pre-
ferences for Eurosceptic parties, since there are high levels of vote fragmentation.
Résumé
En utilisant les données provenant de l’European Election Study 2014, cet article se focalise sur les
positionnements politiques des travailleurs vis-à-vis de l’Union européenne durant la grande
récession. Deux questions de recherche sont abordées. Tout d’abord, comment l’attitude des
travailleurs (manuels) à l’égard de l’UE peut-elle être comparée avec celle des classes moyennes et
supérieures à la suite de la grande récession ? Ensuite, s’agissant du soutien des travailleurs à l’UE, y
a-t-il des différences systématiques entre les pays affectés par la crise ? L’article montre que, d’une
part, en termes de schémas d’affiliation politique des travailleurs, il n’y a pas de différence
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systématique entre les pays affectés à des degrés divers par la grande récession. D’autre part, les
travailleurs éprouvent toujours un détachement fondamental par rapport à l’UE, en particulier
dans le cas des travailleurs manuels. Toutefois, ces niveaux élevés de distanciation généralisée vis-
à-vis de l’UE ne se traduisent pas clairement par des préférences pour les partis eurosceptiques, en
raison des niveaux élevés de fragmentation des votes.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel untersucht die politischen Einstellungen von Arbeitnehmern in Bezug auf die EU
während der Großen Rezession. Er stützt sich auf die Daten der Europäischen Wahlstudie von 2014
und stellt zwei Forschungsfragen: Zunächst werden die Einstellungen von (manuell tätigen)
Arbeitnehmern gegenüber der EU nach der Großen Rezession mit denen von Angehörigen der
Mittel- und Oberklasse verglichen. Anschließend wird in Bezug auf die Unterstützung von Arbeit-
nehmern für die EU gefragt, ob zwischen den von der Krise betroffenen Ländern systematische
Unterschiede bestehen. Die Ergebnisse besagen, dass einerseits in Bezug auf EU-politische Orien-
tierungsmuster keine systematischen Unterschiede bestehen zwischen den Ländern, die unter-
schiedlich schwer von der Krise getroffen wurden. Andererseits empfinden Arbeitnehmer, und
insbesondere manuell tätige Arbeitnehmer, immer noch eine grundlegende Distanz gegenüber der
EU. Jedoch korrespondieren hohe Level einer allgemeinen Distanz gegenüber der EU nicht ein-
deutig mit Präferenzen für europaskeptische Parteien, da das Wahlverhalten stark fragmentiert ist.
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Introduction
This article focuses on workers’ EU political alignments during the Great Recession: we look at the
impact of socio-economic factors (i.e. occupational status and trade union membership, both as
indicators of social class) on support for the European Union (EU) project. For this we use data
from the European Election Study 2014 (EES, 2014) to measure support for the EU by two
dependent variables: voting in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) Elections, categorised in terms
of ‘party families’, and ‘diffuse support’ for the EU project.
We tackle two research questions. First, how does the attitude of (manual) workers towards the
EU compare with that of the middle and upper social strata in the aftermath of the Great Recession?
The earlier literature (see for example Gabel, 1998; Hix, 2005) found relatively greater detachment
on the part of the lower strata of the European population (less educated people, people with lower
incomes and/or in manual occupations). Given the range of political responses to the Great
Recession (austerity policies; privatisation; deregulation – specifically, in the labour market;
electoral promises frequently broken), the unvarnished revelation of the ascendancy of techno-
cratic institutions – the ‘European Troika’ – over elected politicians and the effects of these
policies (rising unemployment and public debt; declining economic output; bank bailouts; lack
of money for public services), especially in the countries most severely affected by the crisis, we
hypothesised that manual workers are still relatively more detached from the EU project than
people in other occupations.
Second, to what extent can the relatively greater detachment of the working classes be
explained by the Great Recession? Are there systematic differences between countries affected
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in varying degrees by the Great Recession when it comes to workers’ EU political alignments (as
measured by support for Eurosceptic parties and diffuse support for the EU project)? If there are,
then we could conclude that this is an indication of the effects of the crisis across countries on
patterns of workers’ EU political alignments. But if there are not, then that will be an indication
that the crisis has done little to disrupt previous patterns of workers’ EU political alignments – and
a sign of the strength of the attitudes that still underpin them.
To answer both these questions, we chose a set of eight countries, selecting them because they
had been severely affected (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Hungary) or less affected (Finland, France,
Sweden, Germany) by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the austerity policies that followed and/
or foreign intervention through bailouts. The article is structured as follows. In the theoretical
section, we present our literature review and some central hypotheses. The third section presents
our data and methodologies. The next two sections are empirical, looking at the impact of socio-
economic factors on support for the EU project: the fourth deals with behaviour and the fifth,
attitudes. The article ends with some concluding remarks and policy recommendations.
Our basic findings are, first, that there are no systematic differences between the countries under
study which were severely affected by the Great Recession and those less affected, in terms of
patterns of workers’ EU political alignments: this means that (manual) workers’ detachment from
the EU project is a long-term phenomenon that predates the crisis – and if the crisis has had any
impact on it, this has been across the whole spectrum of these affected countries. On the other hand,
our second main finding is that workers have remained fundamentally detached from the EU
during the Great Recession, especially those in the lower strata (manual workers).
Theory and hypotheses: attitudes and voting behaviour showing
support for the EU
Historically, economic crisis and social upheavals have been accompanied by radical re-
evaluations of societies’ ways of thinking (Bartels and Bermeo, 2014). In Europe, where globa-
lisation means, above all, ‘European integration’, new political formations have emerged and are
obtaining considerable support. We are talking in particular about the greens and the parties of the
libertarian left (Knutsen, 2004) and about radical right-wing parties (Mudde, 2007). These recently
emerged types of parties have been labelled ‘new left’ and ‘new right’ (Flanagan and Lee, 2003)
and have appeared as a consequence of materialist/post-materialist value change (Inglehart, 1977)
and/or the similar libertarian/authoritarian cleavage (Kitschelt, 1994; Flanagan and Lee, 2003).
This means that several studies on the structure of ideological space have been informed by the
assumption that all conflicts, old and new, can be captured in two broad dimensions: a conflict over
preferences about redistribution and the economic role of government (i.e. the traditional left-right
divide, usually encompassed by the label ‘old politics’); and a cultural dimension formed by
fundamental divisions in values concerning authority, lifestyles and the level and type of citizens’
participation in the political arena (i.e. the so-called ‘new politics’ divide, also labelled ‘the new
left versus new right divide’).
EU integration has added to this phenomenon, creating a new division in ideological spaces by
replacing older ones. Establishment parties have been forced to realign and reposition themselves
on the ideological spectrum as a result of a new conflict: the integration/demarcation cleavage
(Kriesi et al., 2008). Evidence has shown that the appearance of this new cleavage opened a
‘“window of opportunity” for the formation of new political parties and the restructuring of the
national party systems’ (Kriesi et al., 2008: 9). According to Kriesi et al., voters tend to perceive
EU integration in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Kriesi et al., 2008: 4): individuals with more
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education, more ‘possessions’ or more substantive ‘well-being’ tend to favour EU integration more
than people who are, at the macro level, more affected by country bailouts or, at the individual
level, situated on the lower rungs of the social ladder.
A special feature of the most recent, 2014 EP Elections is that they took place at a time of
growing anti-EU sentiment, at least in countries hit by the economic crisis (Freire et al., 2014;
Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2015). In countries such as Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Spain, which
until recently had strong pro-EU feelings, there has been a growth of Euroscepticism, mainly
among communist parties and parties of the radical left and/or the radical right (Freire et al.,
2016; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2015).
The literature contains abundant analysis, based on economic voting theory, of the relationship
between economic conditions and support for European and/or national government. This demon-
strates that voters are more likely to withdraw their support for the government during hard
economic times (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Logically, in countries hit hard by the economic crisis, where
the EU can usually be seen to play a central role in austerity measures, we can predict that voters
are more likely to ‘blame’ the EU for the deterioration in their individual and national economic
conditions (Freire et al., 2014).
Even beyond the economic voting theory literature, it is generally accepted that less wealthy
and/or less educated voters will tend to be less supportive of the EU (Gabel, 1998; Hix, 2005;
Freire et al., 2016). The same goes for ‘the winners of globalisation and/or of Europeanisation’: it
is predicted that there will be more support from the upper/middle classes and from more educated
or affluent people, because they have more ‘assets’ enabling them to profit from the opportunities
created by globalisation and/or by Europeanisation (see Kriesi et al., 2008).
We formulate three overarching hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 (H1) is that less privileged social
strata (especially manual workers) are less supportive of the EU, in terms of diffuse support for the
EU project, by comparison with better-off social groups (white-collar workers and, especially,
managers and the self-employed). This might be due to the weak ‘Social Europe’ component of the
EU project and has perhaps been aggravated by the EU’s political responses to sovereign debt
crisis in Europe, with harsh austerity policies, especially in bailed-out countries (Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Hungary) (see Rodrı́guez-Aguilera de Prat, 2016; Freire et al., 2016; Escalona and Vieira,
2015; Bartels and Bermeo, 2014). Hypothesis 2 (H2) is that members of less privileged social strata
also tend to vote more for parties that are less supportive of the EU project (radical left, radical
right, nationalist/conservative parties) by comparison with better-off social groups, who tend to
vote more for pro-EU parties (social democrats and liberal/conservatives). Of course, we know that
radical left parties and greens (with only a small number of the latter in our samples, we merged
their data with that of the radical left parties) and radical right parties are heterogeneous in terms of
their positions on EU integration – i.e. some are merely Eurosceptic, while others are Europhobic
(see below). However, they all tend to be more Eurosceptic than mainstream parties (social
democrats, liberals and conservatives).
Finally, Hypothesis 3 (H3) concerned variation between countries in terms of the impact of the
Great Recession and patterns of workers’ EU political alignments. We predicted that in the
countries more severely affected by the Great Recession, the context would be prone to increase
workers’ detachment from the EU project by comparison with what happened in the countries less
affected by the Great Recession. However, it was not completely clear whether that increase would
be sufficient to disrupt the previous picture – a generalised pattern of workers’ detachment from
the EU across countries. If it were not, we would have to consider H3 as unconfirmed: in other
words, the impact of previous long-term patterns on workers’ EU political alignments would have
been greater than the impact of the Great Recession.
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Moreover, Euroscepticism is a rather complex phenomenon, and one that is somewhat dif-
ferentiated among the different party families, both in terms of the strength of opposition to EU
integration and in terms of its content (see Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; Kopecký and Mudde,
2002; Kriesi et al., 2008; Leconte, 2010; Charalambous, 2011; Rodrı́guez-Aguilera de Prat,
2016). In 2002, studying party-based Euroscepticism across EU Member States and the then
candidate states, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 7) broke down their definition of the phenom-
enon into two: ‘hard Euroscepticism’, which is a party’s principled opposition to EU integration
and advocates withdrawal from the EU or defends policies that have as their corollary opposition
to the whole EU project; and ‘soft Euroscepticism’, which is not a principled opposition to EU
integration, but where the party’s concerns over policies lead to ‘the expression of qualified
opposition to the EU’. In the Member States, the authors found that ‘hard Euroscepticism’ was
fundamentally a characteristic of the radical right, with the exceptions of France, Sweden and
Denmark, where hard Eurosceptics were also found on the radical left; ‘soft Euroscepticism’
was more common among radical left and some conservative parties (Taggart and Szczerbiak,
2002: 10–11).
Studying political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) proposed
a more complex classification, with four types: ‘Europhobe’ (opposing one or both of the two
fundamental organisational principles of the EU: pooled sovereignty at the political level and an
integrated free-market economy at the economic level); ‘Europhile’ (espousing both these prin-
ciples); and – measured by attitudes towards specific EU policy orientations – ‘EU-optimist’, when
positive, and ‘EU-pessimist’, when negative. In findings similar to those of Taggart and Szczerbiak
(2002), the authors concluded that ‘Eurorejects’ (Europhobe and EU-pessimist) are mainly con-
centrated on the radical right and ‘Eurosceptics’ (Europhile and EU-pessimist), mainly in the
conservative party family (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 16–17). Using the two theoretical
approaches presented above, a recent study of the radical left in western Europe (Charalambous,
2011: 311–316) concluded that most of the western European parties described as ‘radical left’
were either ‘soft Eurosceptics’ or ‘Eurosceptics’ (Europhile and EU-pessimist).
But it is not only the level (or strength) of Euroscepticism that differs between the (radical) right
and the (radical) left: it is also its ideological or issue content (Kriesi et al., 2008; see also Leconte,
2010: 100–134). From the right, and especially the radical right, opposition to (or ‘demarcation’
from) Europe (and globalisation) is mainly across the ‘cultural dimension’ – in other words,
expressed in terms of opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. From the left, and above
all the radical left, ‘demarcation’ from Europe and globalisation is mainly across the ‘economic
dimension’, i.e. defending the national welfare state, public services and market regulation, oppos-
ing (further) integration into the European and global neoliberal economy (with more privatisation,
deregulation and welfare state retrenchment). At the level of institutions and of responses to the so-
called ‘democratic deficit’, we can also see differences between party families in terms of insti-
tutional reform and patterns of opposition to EU integration (Rodrı́guez-Aguilera de Prat, 2016:
99–141): the right, and especially the radical right, puts more emphasis on opposition to pooled
sovereignty and on proposals to restore national sovereignty, while the left, and especially the
radical left, emphasises proposals (more or less radically) to democratise the EU and restore the
primacy of politics over economics.
Our point here is twofold. First, we argue that Euroscepticism has a different profile on the
right and on the left, in terms of both value orientations and strength of opposition to the EU.
Second, from these differences follow the (mostly normative) underpinnings of our recommen-
dation for left-left alliances (i.e. radical left and greens with social democrats and socialists),
which could fight for a different kind of Europe but without espousing a nationalistic approach to
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EU integration. Euroscepticism is a very different phenomenon on the (radical) left and on the
(radical and nationalist/conservative) right, specifically in terms of its consequences for the EU
project. We shall return to this point in our conclusions and, especially, in our policy
recommendations.
Data and methods
This article relies mainly on quantitative comparative analyses of mass survey data from the
European Election Study 2014. For details, see: http://eeshomepage.net/ees-2014-study/
When it came to case selection, we decided to focus on countries which had different experi-
ences during the Great Recession, as already listed above (see Introduction). As to variables, we
decided to pick a set of independent variables in order to explain our two dependent variables: (1)
party family vote in the 2014 EP Elections and (2) attitudes towards the EU (see Supplementary
material; Appendices 1 and 2 for a full description of all the variables and their respective
operationalisation). Since our main objectives were to analyse the specific impact of socio-
economic variables on support for the EU, in terms of both attitudes and behaviour towards the
EU, we chose the following independent variables: (1) occupational group; (2) trade union mem-
bership (self and family). Trade union membership is used as an additional indicator of social class:
it is usually associated with worker status (both manual and non-manual); moreover it is said to be
one of the organisational components of the class cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Franklin
et al., 1992; Knutsen, 2004; Evans and De Graaf, 2013). As far as the impact of trade union
membership on workers’ EU political alignments is concerned, we predicted that the situation
would be more mixed than with the impact of occupational group. This is for two reasons – first,
because union members include both blue-collar and white-collar workers, and the latter have been
shown to be less detached from the EU project than the former; second, because at least some union
members may be more likely to support the EU – or at least, pro-EU parties – on the basis of the
longstanding alliance between (at least some) trade unions and social democrats.
The first stage of our statistical analysis focuses on bivariate analyses, in which we describe and
relate each independent variable to each dependent variable. Here, we also use correlations and/or
association measures and chi-square tests. In the second stage, we adopt multivariate analysis
(logistic regression analysis – binary in regard to support for the EU and multinomial in regard to
voting choices) to test the impact of socio-economic factors (two dummies for occupation: D1,
white-collar or non-manual workers and D2, manual or blue-collar workers, with the self-
employed and managers as reference group; one dummy for trade union membership: 1, member
of union – self and/or family and 0, non-member), but controlling for other relevant factors (left-
right self-placement on a scale of 0–10 from left to right; perceptions of the state of the national
economy from 1, negative to 5, positive; Europe versus country attachment: -3 implies higher
attachment to Europe and 3 denotes higher attachment to the country of origin).
Three points should be noted with regard to occupational groups. First, in Table A1.2.1
(Supplementary material; Appendix 1), we give a description of each of the four categories
we are using. Second, taking into account the existing literature on this topic (Franklin et al.,
1992: 3–60; Kitschelt, 1994: 8–66; Knutsen, 2004: 1–2, 159–197, 224–277), we acknowledge
that each of these groups is internally fragmented in terms of social status and political orienta-
tions. For example, it is very likely that the self-employed category includes many workers
forced into self-employment, perhaps with left-wing leanings. Third, however, we are not in a
position to apply more detailed categories, due to the small number of cases and the limitations
of using secondary data.
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The impact of occupational group and trade union membership on
support for the EU (I): voting choices, 2014
We shall begin by analysing manual and non-manual workers’ EU political alignments in terms of
political behaviour, i.e. of their party vote in the 2014 EP Elections. Party vote, our first dependent
variable, is operationalised in terms of party families: ‘radical left/greens’, ‘social democrats’,
‘liberal/conservative’, ‘nationalist/conservative’ and ‘far right’ (see Supplementary material;
Appendix 2). In the main, we shall use social class/occupational group as the independent variable
for measuring ‘socio-economic factors’. In terms of occupation, our main focus will be to compare
the party votes of workers (white-collar and manual workers) with those of managers and the self-
employed. Within each occupational group, we determine for each social class which is the party
family most voted for (row percentages), then the second and the third most voted-for party
families. In addition, we check whether or not there is a left-left majority among workers (i.e. a
majority of workers voting for radical left/greens and social democrats taken together). We are
adopting this approach because, as we have explained above, Euroscepticism differs significantly,
in terms of both content and strength, from the left to the right – and this has relevant implications
for coalition politics and for policy recommendations. In Tables 1 and 2, we also present the total
number of cases by party (column totals) and by occupational group (row totals).
We can see that, in Greece, the ‘radical left/greens’ category is the party family most voted for
(with an absolute majority among manual workers and a near-majority among white-collar work-
ers), probably due to the SYRIZA phenomenon, and that ‘liberal/conservative’ is the second most
voted-for party family (see Table 1). However, in all occupational groups, a majority takes the left-
left option – although this is particularly the case among workers. However, workers also demon-
strate around 10 per cent support for the ‘far right’, as do the self-employed. On the other hand,
these patterns of relationships are not statistically significant, i.e. there are no major differences
between the social classes in Greece in terms of party voting.
In the case of Spain, although manual workers (curiously, like managers) seem to be evenly
divided between ‘radical left/greens’ and ‘liberal/conservative’, there is a left-left majority in every
occupational group except the self-employed – although it is especially large among white-collar
workers and managers (see Table 1). These patterns of relationships are statistically significant,
although with only medium strength of association.
In Finland, among all classes, the majority of votes go to ‘liberal/conservative’ and, alone or
taken together with ‘nationalist/conservative’, there is consistently a majority right-wing vote
across all classes, even among manual workers (see Table 1). What is more, the latter are the
ones who vote more for ‘nationalist/conservative’ (24.6 per cent), the party family that is closer to
the far right. These patterns of relationships are statistically significant, although with only
medium strength of association.
In France, the voting choices of the social classes are highly fragmented. First, the party family
most voted for by manual workers is the ‘far right’: this party family and ‘liberal/conservatives’
taken together received the majority of manual workers’ votes (see Table 1). Although there is a
left-left majority among white-collar workers (as among managers), a substantial proportion of
these individuals voted ‘liberal/conservative’ (23.8 per cent) or ‘far right’ (19.0 per cent). Self-
employed people voted mainly for the right. These patterns of relationships are statistically sig-
nificant, although with only medium strength of association.
In Portugal, there is a left-left majority in all classes, although it is especially strong among
manual workers (see Table 2). However, there is high vote fragmentation in all the occupational
groups, with right-wing parties being the first choice of both managers and white-collar workers
Freire et al. 7
Table 1. Party family vote in the 2014 EP Elections, by social class.
Radical left/greens Social democrats Liberal/conservative Nationalist/conservative Far right
Occupation Row N% Row N% Row N% Row N% Row N% Total N
Greece Self-employed 40.6% 13.3% 25.9% 8.4% 11.9% 143 (44.54%)
Managers 45.7% 8.6% 40.0% 2.9% 2.9% 35 (10.9%)
White-collar 49.5% 16.1% 17.2% 7.5% 9.7% 93 (28.97%)
Manual workers 58.0% 12.0% 16.0% 4.0% 10.0% 50 (15.58%)
Total N 149 (46.41%) 43 (13.39%) 75 (23.36%) 22 (6.85%) 32 (9.96%) 321
Cramer’s V 0.126
Pearson’s chi2 15.372
Spain Self-employed 10.5% 26.3% 63.2% 0.0% 0.0% 19 (14.61%)
Managers 38.9% 27.8% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 18 (13.85%)
White-collar 59.1% 27.3% 13.6% 0.0% 0.0% 22 (16.92%)
Manual workers 38.0% 23.9% 38.0% 0.0% 0.0% 71 (54.62%)
Total N 49 (37.69%) 33 (25.38%) 48 (36.92%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 130
Cramer’s V 0.227*
Pearson’s chi2 13.397*
Finland Self-employed 20.8% 6.3% 64.6% 8.3% 0.0% 48 (16.55%)
Managers 26.1% 6.0% 63.4% 4.5% 0.0% 134 (46.21%)
White-collar 24.3% 21.6% 40.5% 13.5% 0.0% 37 (12.76%)
Manual workers 11.5% 29.5% 34.4% 24.6% 0.0% 61 (21.03%)
Total N 61 (21.03%) 37 (12.75%) 152 (52.41%) 30 (10.34%) 0 (0%) 290
Cramer’s V 0.246**
Pearson’s chi2 50.653**
France Self-employed 21.7% 8.7% 52.2% 0.0% 17.4% 23 (15.44%)
Managers 26.8% 33.9% 28.6% 1.8% 8.9% 56 (37.84%)
White-collar 28.6% 28.6% 23.8% 0.0% 19.0% 21 (14.09%)
Manual workers 22.4% 22.4% 16.3% 4.1% 34.7% 49 (32.89%)




Source: Data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study (2014).
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Table 2. Party family vote in the 2014 EP Elections, by social class.
Radical left/Greens Social Democrats Liberal/Conservative Nationalist/Conservative Far right
Occupation Row N% Row N% Row N% Row N% Row N% Total N
Portugal Self-employed 18.5% 51.9% 29.6% 0.0% 0.0% 27 (20.15%)
Managers 29.6% 25.9% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% 27 (20.15%)
White-collar 28.6% 28.6% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 21 (15.67%)
Manual workers 30.5% 42.4% 27.1% 0.0% 0.0% 59 (44.03%)
Total N 37 (27.61%) 52 (38.80%) 45 (33.48%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 134
Cramer’s V 0.155
Pearson’s chi2 6.480
Sweden Self-employed 42.9% 10.2% 42.9% 4.1% 0.0% 49 (9.44%)
Managers 44.5% 18.8% 33.5% 3.1% 0.0% 191 (36.8%)
White-collar 36.4% 23.3% 31.0% 9.3% 0.0% 129 (24.86%)
Manual workers 48.7% 24.0% 23.3% 4.0% 0.0% 150 (28.9%)
Total N 226 (43.54%) 107 (20.61%) 160 (30.82%) 26 (5.00%) 0 (0%) 519
Cramer’s V 0.109*
Pearson’s chi2 18.527*
Germany Self-employed 37.5% 17.9% 42.9% 1.8% 0.0% 56 (16.47%)
Managers 27.2% 28.1% 36.0% 8.8% 0.0% 114 (33.53%)
White-collar 20.0% 24.3% 47.1% 8.6% 0.0% 70 (20.59%)
Manual workers 25.0% 40.0% 28.0% 7.0% 0.0% 100 (29.41%)
Total N 91 (26.76%) 99 (29.11%) 126 (37.05%) 24 (7.05%) 0 (0%) 340
Cramer’s V 0.134*
Pearson’s chi2 18.430*
Hungary Self-employed 0.0% 26.9% 0.0% 61.5% 11.5% 26 (13.9%)
Managers 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 56.7% 3.3% 30 (16.04%)
White-collar 0.0% 21.7% 0.0% 69.6% 8.7% 46 (24.6%)
Manual workers 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 57.6% 22.4% 85 (45.45%)




Source: Data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study (2014).
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(44.4 per cent and 42.9 per cent, respectively). Perhaps due to the high level of class-related vote
fragmentation, relationships here are not statistically significant.
In Sweden, every occupational group consistently shows a left-left majority of voters, although
this is much larger among workers (see Table 2). The relationships are statistically significant,
although with rather weak association.
Germany is also characterised by very high fragmentation of party choices across all the social
classes, although there is a consistent left-left majority in all occupational groups except white-
collar workers (see Table 2) – and this is especially large among manual workers. Again, these
relationships are statistically significant, although with rather weak association.
Finally, the case of Hungary is a somewhat singular one: ‘nationalist/conservative’ received an
absolute majority of the vote in each and every social class (see Table 2). Taken together, ‘nation-
alist/conservative’ and the ‘far right’ receive absolute majorities of the vote in every occupational
group: this explains why there are no statistically relevant differences between the social classes.
Overall, the above analyses allow us to draw the following conclusions about our second
hypothesis (H2). Among the lowest social class strata (manual workers), support for parties with
a relatively more Eurosceptic stance (‘radical left/greens’, ‘nationalist/conservative’, and ‘far
right’) is usually more widespread than among higher class strata (white-collar workers, managers
and the self-employed). However, due to the very high vote fragmentation of occupational groups,
bivariate relationships between social class and vote (set out above) are significant in only half the
countries studied (Spain, Finland, France, Sweden and Germany): thus, confirmation of H2 is
limited to a subset of cases. In addition, except in Finland, France and Hungary, there are consistent
left-left majorities among workers. Moreover, sizeable support among workers for Eurosceptic
parties, either on the radical left or on the nationalist and/or far right, is present not only in the
countries most severely affected by the crisis but also in those less affected: so the latter does not
seem to have done much to alter the main patterns of workers’ EU political alignments in terms of
support for Eurosceptic parties.
Turning now to the political cohesion of trade union members as compared with non-members
(see Table A5.1 in Supplementary material; Appendix 5), we can say that, for all the countries
except Finland and Hungary (where ‘liberal/conservative’ and ‘nationalist/conservative’ or
‘nationalist/conservative’ and the ‘far right’, respectively, receive an absolute majority of union
members’ votes), the political cohesion of trade union members is much higher than that of the
social classes. This is demonstrated by the fact that each and every other country (i.e. six out of
eight) consistently shows an absolute left-left majority among union members. However, only in
Spain, Finland, Portugal, Germany and Sweden are these relationships statistically significant (in
other words, five out of eight cases). Thus, there is a much lower level of political fragmentation in
this regard than across the social classes, except in countries where there is a significant
authoritarian-libertarian party divide. The left-left majorities among union members in all coun-
tries except Finland and Hungary also indicate that, as expected, support for the EU project is
mixed. However, the weakness of relationships (according to association measures) or their lack of
statistical significance in many countries is probably due to the fact that differences between the
voting behaviour of trade union members and that of non-members are not particularly strong (at
least in some countries).
In looking at how occupational group and trade union membership related to voting choices, we
also performed multivariate analysis with multinomial logistic regressions, using these two inde-
pendent variables and other control variables (left-right ideology, perceptions of the state of the
economy, European versus national attachment/identity). The data are shown in the Supplemen-
tary material; Appendix 3: equations with no control variables, Table A3.1, with all control
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variables, Table A3.2, and with all control variables except left-right self-placement, Table A3.3
(see Supplementary material; Appendix 3). The reference category for the dependent variable is
always the ‘liberal/conservative’ right – except in Hungary, where the latter’s weakness meant that
we used the ‘nationalist and far right’ group. The active categories are shown in the first column of
Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3 in the Supplementary material; Appendix 3. Basically, our results
highlight the weakness of the impact of both occupational group and trade union membership on
workers’ EU political alignments in terms of voting choices, especially when we control for other
(mediating) factors: this is because there is a very high level of fragmentation in voting choices.
These findings reinforce our bivariate results and the corresponding statistical tests.1 First, when
contrasting the ‘radical left/green’ vote with the ‘liberal/conservative’ vote, only social class is
relevant – and then only in France (where white-collar workers vote less for the right than do the
self-employed and managers: note that these two categories were collapsed into only one for
multivariate regression analysis, Tables A3.1 to A3.3 in Supplementary material; Appendix 3)
and Finland (where manual workers vote more for the right than this reference group does: see
Tables A3.1 to A3.3 in Supplementary material; Appendix 3). Second, when contrasting the ‘social
democrat’ vote with the ‘liberal/conservative’ vote, both social class (in France, Finland and
Germany, where manual workers vote more for the liberal-conservative right than do the self-
employed and managers: see Tables A3.1 to A3.3 in Supplementary material; Appendix 3) and
trade union membership (in Germany, where union members vote more for the right than the
reference group does) have a significant impact, but very rarely (i.e. significant relationships are
limited to a minority of countries and coefficients). Third, when contrasting the ‘nationalist
conservative/far right’ vote with the ‘liberal/conservative’ vote, both social class (in France and
Finland, where manual workers vote less for the nationalist right and the far right than do the self-
employed and managers: see Tables A3.1 to A3.3 in Supplementary material; Appendix 3) and
trade union membership (in Sweden, where union members vote less for the nationalist and far
right than the reference group does) have a significant impact, but again very rarely.
Some of these findings are to some extent unexpected: for instance, when we compare social
democrats with liberal/conservatives, we find that manual workers tend to vote more for the right
than do managers and the self-employed. It may be argued that this could be due to the small
number of cases and/or the large number of controls in our analysis. However, even when we
collapse the control for left-right self-placement, our results remain fairly similar: the core electo-
rate of the left votes more for the right than the core electorate of the right (see Table A3.3 in
Supplementary material; Appendix 3), or, to put it in another way, people who traditionally form
the core electorate of the left are now voting more for the right than they used to, in such large
numbers that their votes outweigh those of the core electorate of the right, even though the latter
have remained faithful to the right: in other words, there has been a massive swing to the right, with
people who used to vote for left-wing parties but now vote for right-wing parties outnumbering
those who have always voted for the right and continue to do so. This could also be because we are
still applying a significant number of controls to a low number of cases – or perhaps because of the
limitations of our class typologies; or on the other hand, it could be attributable to the growing
irrelevance of social class in explaining voting patterns. It could also be because we are looking at
EP elections, which have small turnouts and are strongly biased towards protest votes. This is an
area which requires further research.
1 For all the regressions performed in this and the next section, we must emphasise that regression diagnoses
consistently showed the analyses to be robust.
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The impact of occupational group and trade union membership on
support for the EU (II): diffuse support, 2014
Party voting in the 2014 EP Elections is a useful indicator of workers’ support for the EU, but it is
also a limited one. This is because people have different motivations when they vote in EP
elections, as we have already explained. Thus, voters’ choices in EP elections are not always
directly motivated by EU issues; and even when they are, the latter are not necessarily among the
most salient issues. This is one of the main reasons why we need direct measures of support for the
EU – which we shall make our dependent variable in this section. We used the best indicator of
diffuse support for the EU project available in EES 2014 (‘Generally speaking, do you think that
(our country)’s membership of the EU is . . . ? a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad’)
and tested the impact of occupational group and trade union membership on it.
We begin by summarising our bivariate results and the corresponding statistical tests
(chi-square and association measures): relating occupational group to our dependent variable –
diffuse support for the EU project – we come to the following conclusions (see Tables 3 and 4).
Even in Spain and Germany (where there is an absolute majority of EU supporters – ‘good thing’ –
within every social class), workers (white-collar and manual, but especially the latter) are the least
supportive or among the least supportive occupational groups. In the other countries, white-collar
workers and, above all, manual workers are the occupational groups which are the least supportive
of the EU – furthermore, this usually means only minority support, i.e. the support for the EU
within the occupational group is below absolute majority (less than around 51 per cent of the total
number of respondents in the group (except white-collar workers in Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and
Hungary: so it is only for manual workers that we can perceive an absolutely clear pattern of
workers’ detachment from the EU project, widespread across countries). Thus the least privileged
strata of the population – manual workers – are the occupational group least supportive of the EU,
while in some countries – Finland, France, and Germany – they are joined by white-collar workers.
These relationships are consistently statistically significant, except in Spain.
Summarising our bivariate results and the statistical tests relating trade union membership to
diffuse support for the EU project (see Table A5.2 in Supplementary material; Appendix 5), we
conclude that trade union members are least supportive of the EU in Greece, Finland, France and
Sweden, as compared with non-members. However, even in Finland and Sweden, a majority of
union members is in favour of the EU: it is only a matter of relative support. In contrast, in all the
other countries, trade union members are more supportive of the EU when compared with non-
members (although in Portugal this nevertheless means only minority support). In any case, the
differences between union members and non-members are usually rather small: this explains why
the differences are statistically relevant only in Germany.
Multivariate tests using logistic regression analysis and taking diffuse support for the EU
project (1, support for EU: ‘good thing’; 0, no support for EU: ‘bad thing’ or ‘neither good nor
bad’) as the dependent variable (see evidence in Table A4.1 in Supplementary material; Appen-
dix 4) allow us to highlight the following. The multivariate test results basically confirm our
bivariate analysis: i.e. whether we control for three other relevant factors (Model 2) or do not
control for other factors (Model 1), manual workers consistently (i.e. in all countries – except in
Spain, where there is no effect) demonstrate lower support for the EU than do the self-employed
or managers. The same ‘negative’ support for the EU holds good for non-manual workers,
although only in Finland and Germany (only without controls) and France (with and without
controls). Trade union membership has a significant positive impact only in Spain: thus, it is
usually not a relevant factor. Moreover, using Xpost software (see http://www.indiana.edu/
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*jslsoc/web_spost9/sp_xpost.htm) in Figures 1 to 8 (one graph for each of the countries stud-
ied), we present the predicted probability of workers’ support for the EU (non-manual and
manual workers, always compared to the self-employed and managers – the reference group)
(vertical axis), controlling for all other three factors, including left-right self-placement (shown
in the horizontal axis). Here we can basically see two things. First, respondents positioned on the
left are usually more Eurosceptic than those on the right, except in France (where the reverse is
true) and Germany (no relation: horizontal lines). Second, in all the countries other than Spain,
manual workers are consistently less supportive of the EU than are white-collar workers, and this
is especially true in France, Germany, Finland and Greece. The gap is especially pronounced on
Table 3. Support for the EU by social class, 2014.
QP7 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the EU is . . . ?
A bad thing
Neither a good
nor a bad thing A good thing
Occupation Row N% Row N% Row N% Total N
Greece Self-employed 24.0% 33.7% 42.3% 208 (40.07%)
Managers 14.3% 19.6% 66.1% 56 (10.79%)
Other white-collar 23.4% 31.0% 45.5% 145 (27.94%)
Manual workers 26.4% 40.0% 33.6% 110 (21.19%)
Total N 121 (23.31%) 170 (32.75%) 228 (43.93%) 519
Cramer’s V 0.126*
Pearson’s chi2 16.439*
Spain Self-employed 11.0% 27.4% 61.6% 73 (17.63%)
Managers 1.8% 29.8% 68.4% 57 (13.77%)
Other white-collar 7.7% 24.6% 67.7% 65 (15.7%)
Manual workers 14.6% 23.7% 61.6% 219 (52.9%)
Total N 46 (11.11%) 105 (25.36%) 263 (63.52%) 414
Cramer’s V 0.104
Pearson’s chi2 8.955
Finland Self-employed 5.3% 26.3% 68.4% 76 (14.53%)
Managers 7.3% 16.8% 75.9% 191 (36.52%)
Other white-collar 8.5% 39.0% 52.4% 82 (15.67%)
Manual workers 17.2% 33.3% 49.4% 174 (33.26%)
Total N 55 (10.51%) 142 (27.15%) 326 (62.33%) 523
Cramer’s V 0.191**
Pearson’s chi2 38.002*
France Self-employed 15.6% 22.2% 62.2% 45 (9.61%)
Managers 5.7% 19.3% 75.0% 140 (29.91%)
Other white-collar 16.1% 35.6% 48.3% 87 (18.58%)
Manual workers 20.4% 37.2% 42.3% 195 (41.66%)




Source: Data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study (2014).
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the right in France and on the left in Finland; in the other countries, the gap between workers is
more or less flat across the ideological camps.
Applying the findings in this section to our hypotheses, we can clearly confirm our first
hypothesis (H1): the less privileged social strata (i.e. workers – especially and above all, manual
workers) are usually less supportive of the EU than are better-off social groups (white-collar
workers and, above all, managers and the self-employed). The trade union membership effect is
usually irrelevant. Again, we found that there are no major differences between countries in terms
of workers’ generalised detachment from the EU project, though there may be some differences in
extent. Workers, especially manual workers, are usually more detached from the EU than are other
Table 4. Support for the EU by social class, 2014.
QP7 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the EU is . . . ?
A bad thing
Neither a good
nor a bad thing A good thing
Occupation Row N% Row N% Row N% Total N
Portugal Self-employed 28.0% 25.3% 46.7% 75 (16.51%)
Managers 9.6% 24.7% 65.8% 73 (16.07%)
Other white-collar 14.3% 21.4% 64.3% 70 (15.41%)
Manual workers 22.9% 37.3% 39.8% 236 (51.98%)
Total N 92 (20.26%) 140 (30.84%) 222 (48.90%) 454
Cramer’s V 0.172**
Pearson’s chi2 26.863**
Sweden Self-employed 11.5% 19.7% 68.9% 61 (9.61%)
Managers 12.3% 22.4% 65.4% 228 (35.91%)
Other white-collar 13.0% 18.8% 68.2% 154 (24.25%)
Manual workers 23.4% 28.6% 47.9% 192 (30.24%)
Total N 100 (15.75%) 147 (23.15) 388 (61.10%) 635
Cramer’s V 0.133**
Pearson’s chi2 22.526**
Germany Self-employed 13.8% 12.8% 73.4% 94 (9.60%)
Managers 6.8% 10.9% 82.3% 192 (35.90%)
Other white-collar 5.9% 25.2% 68.9% 135 (24.25%)
Manual workers 11.7% 34.0% 54.3% 256 (30.23%)
Total N 64 (9.45%) 154 (22.75%) 459 (67.80%) 677
Cramer’s V 0.193**
Pearson’s chi2 50.276**
Hungary Self-employed 17.3% 25.0% 57.7% 52 (10.17%)
Managers 9.9% 39.4% 50.7% 71 (13.89%)
Other white-collar 8.4% 39.3% 52.3% 107 (20.93%)
Manual workers 11.0% 49.5% 39.5% 281 (54.99%)




Source: Data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study (2014).
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occupational groups. This pattern is found in all the countries studied, irrespective of the impact of
the Great Recession: thus, we do not confirm our third hypothesis (H3).
Concluding remarks and policy recommendations
The analysis set out in this article has, in essence, clearly confirmed H1 (concerning workers’
diffuse support for the EU project), while finding limited confirmation of H2 (concerning workers’
Figure 1. Greece – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
Figure 2. Spain – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
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voting support for Eurosceptic parties). First, during the Great Recession and its aftermath, work-
ers (both manual and white-collar, but especially the former) have remained more detached from
the EU integration project than have other occupational groups (the self-employed and managers),
confirming the findings of previous (though now outdated) studies (see Gabel, 1998; Hix, 2005).
The lower class strata of the population, especially manual workers, remain more distant from the
EU than do better-off groups, in terms of both H2 (they vote more for Eurosceptic parties, either
from the radical left or from the radical right and the nationalist conservative right) and H1 (they
Figure 3. Finland – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
Figure 4. France – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
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demonstrate lower diffuse support for the EU project). Moreover, the reader should also be aware
that in many countries (six out of eight in our study, the exceptions being Germany and Spain), the
support of manual workers for the EU is so low that it means that only a minority of them support
the EU project (i.e. less 50 per cent). However, these results are clearer for blue-collar than for
white-collar workers. With the former, this situation pertains in all eight countries studied: manual
workers’ support for the EU is always the smallest among the four occupational groups. With
white-collar workers, majority support for the EU is the rule, except in Greece and France;
Figure 5. Portugal – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
Figure 6. Sweden – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
Freire et al. 17
additionally, in terms of the relative level of support for the EU white-collar workers usually show
a middle-of-the road position between the manual workers (the lowest levels of support for the EU
among the four occupational groups) and one or two of the other two occupational groups (in all
the eight countries considered). Both the bivariate analysis (see the data in Tables 3 and 4) and,
more importantly, the multivariate analysis (see Figures 1 to 8 and Table A4.1 in Supplementary
material; Appendix 4) show abundant evidence supporting these interpretations.
Figure 7. Germany – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
Figure 8. Hungary – probability of workers’ support for the EU.
Source: Data elaborated by the authors using EES (2014).
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Moreover, the pattern of manual workers’ EU detachment is much clearer when it comes to
diffuse support for the EU project (clearly confirming H1) than for voting choices (H2), where vote
fragmentation in all occupational groups is the norm. Thus, we found only rather limited support
for H2: in other words, the tendency of members of less privileged social strata to vote for
Eurosceptic parties is visible in statistically significant relationships in only a small number of
countries/situations, especially at the multivariate level. Again, both the bivariate analysis (see the
data in Tables 1 and 2, for voting choices, and Tables 3 and 4, for diffuse support for the EU) and,
above all, the multivariate analysis (see the data in Tables A3.1 to A3.3 in Supplementary material;
Appendix 3, for voting choices, and Figures 1.1 to 1.8 and Table A4.1 in Supplementary material;
Appendix 4, for diffuse support for the EU) show evidence substantiating these arguments.
As for H3, the results are basically negative – that is, we found no major differences between
countries in terms of workers’ generalised detachment from the EU, whether this was expressed
through party voting or through diffuse support for the EU project. So, even if workers are more
detached from the EU after the Great Recession than they were before – something we did not
test systematically – the important point underlined by our study is that, if this is actually the
case, it has happened across the board (as far as countries are concerned) and thus has not
disturbed the picture of widespread manual workers’ detachment from the EU, generalised
across countries.
Since these patterns of manual workers’ detachment from the EU are relatively independent of
the crisis (because they were found not only in countries more severely affected by the crisis but
also in less affected countries), there must be some structural component here, connected with
fundamental interests, values and political visions of the EU. In addition, when measuring diffuse
support for the EU project, as opposed to voting choices, we obtained highly consistent results: in
all the countries studied, regardless of how severely affected by the crisis, manual workers were
always less supportive of the EU than all the other occupational groups (though sometimes – in
France, Finland and Germany – they were joined by non-manual workers). This too points to a
structural, long-term attitude behind workers’ detachment from the EU integration project,
connected with their underlying value orientations and political visions. Of course, these patterns
could also be due to the fact that manual workers were already in a bad position before the crisis
and their situation has not changed much since the Great Recession, with their attitudes being
based on their (material) interests, not just on their values, or even independently of their value
orientations.
It is also worth mentioning two further points, especially with regard to formulating policy
recommendations. First, in most of the countries we studied (the exceptions were Finland and
Hungary), the majority of workers demonstrated left-left political alignment (i.e. social democrats
and radical left/greens taken together) – although in France this was the case only for non-manual
workers, and in Germany the opposite was true. Second, there are indications of stronger political
cohesion on the part of trade union members (more of them were left-left aligned) when compared
with non-members.
We finish with some policy recommendations. First, trade unions should invest in new political
alliances (i.e. in left-left coalitions, which usually gather a majority of support from workers in the
countries we studied) in order to fight for a Social Europe, a more democratic Europe and a Europe
that gives a stronger institutional role to workers’ representatives than does the status quo, which
clearly favours corporations. (These are all issues identified in the literature and can be said to
underlie, at least in part, the rift between workers and the EU: see Blyth, 2012; Burns et al., 2000;
Schmitter, 2000, 2011; Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013; Merkel, 2015; Escalona and Vieira, 2015;
Rodrı́guez-Aguilera de Prat, 2016.) Second, these new left-left political alliances will be
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fundamental to avoiding a situation in which nationalist conservatives and the far right/radical
right monopolise the fight against European radical free-market economics (as in Hungary, Finland
or France). This is a problem not least because, as shown in our literature review, Euroscepticism is
a very different phenomenon on the (radical) left and on the (radical and nationalist conservative)
right – in terms of its consequences for the EU project. On the (radical) right, where there are more
‘Europhobes’ and/or ‘hard Eurosceptics’, it usually implies convergence with neoliberal globali-
sation in economic terms and with pushing back the EU project in the cultural and political
dimensions (respectively, opposing immigration and expressing nationalist tendencies in rejection
of pooled sovereignty). On the (radical) left, where ‘Europhiles’, ‘EU-pessimists’ and/or ‘soft
Eurosceptics’ are more often found, it usually implies opposition to neoliberal globalisation,
meaning pushing back the EU project in economic terms but accepting integration in the cultural
and political dimensions (tolerant attitudes towards immigration; usually not opposing the princi-
ple of pooled sovereignty but demanding profound, radical democratisation of the EU). Finally,
trade union membership remains a relevant aspect of political cohesion for the working class
(manual and non-manual), although only in voting choices. Thus, it is still worth pursuing invest-
ment in unionisation and backing more social and more democratic versions of the EU project,
supported by new left-left coalitions at the party level.
Finally, we should underline three major limitations of this article, which future research should
address. First, we have been able to consider only a limited number of countries, whether in
western Europe or in Central and Eastern Europe (especially for the latter), which leaves more
room for an individual country’s specificities to affect the results. Thus, a similar study covering
more EU countries – preferably all of them – is recommended. Second, the left has been so weak in
Central and Eastern Europe (the radical left ever since 1989 and the centre left, more recently) that
our recommendations for left-left alliances are hardly feasible there (see Berglund et al., 2003) – at
least for the time being. Because of this and other historical/political factors, a specific, separate
study covering Central and Eastern Europe is certainly also to be recommended. Third, the
fragmentation of the workers’ vote across the whole spectrum of left-wing parties could make
our recommendation for a stronger leftist alliance unfeasible in some countries. In others, however,
there are still strong left-left majorities among workers, so a left-left coalition strategy on the part
of political parties and/or trade unions might provide the conditions not only to consolidate these
politically, but also to increase them numerically.
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